Introduction:
India is nowadays one of the world’s largest markets for digital internet technologies. While operating in India one needs to abide by the principles and laws issued by relevant ministries and departments, including those pertaining to data security and privacy of individual data. On 15 June 2020, a violent clash erupted on India- China border in Ladakh that left 20 Indian soldiers dead. The Union Government initiated a bold move in banning 59 Chinese apps citing data security and sovereignty concerns. These embrace the popular ones like TikTok, UC Browser, Club Factory, WeChat, etc. The decision to ban the Chinese app has a significant impact since it is a proven fact that Indians are highly dependent on Chinese apps. This article analyses the legality of India’s ban on Chinese apps and also deals with the various issues and challenges in the law.
The legality of the ban on 59 Chinese Apps
The Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (IT) has blocked 59 Chinese Apps, by invoking Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 read with the relevant provisions of Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009[1]. According to a press statement issued by the Ministry of Electronics & IT, the banned apps have “engaged in activities which are prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, the security of the state and public order.” The ban has been invoked under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008. This power can be exercised where the Central Government or it’s authorized officers if they consider it “necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offense relating to above”[2]. These components stem from the grounds specified in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution permitting reasonable restrictions on the right to the freedom of speech and expression. The audacious move by the Indian Government has been claimed as a “digital strike” but legal analysts seek greater clarity and justifications on the legal process backing this decision of the government.
Issues and Challenges
There are some legal repercussions that have emerged from the Indian Government’s decision to block access to 59 Chinese apps. A brief analysis regarding the legal repercussions of the ban is put forth below.
- The ban is inconsistent with the provisions of the IT Act
The Government’s decision to ban 59 Chinese apps is inconsistent with the provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Firstly, the procedure for exercising this blocking power is prescribed in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. As per Rule 5, the power to block public access to online information is accorded to a Designated Officer and that can be exercised only upon a request from either a “Nodal Officer” or a competent court. In this case, the decision does not come either from a court or from a Nodal officer. Secondly, Rule 7 requires that the request for blocking a computer source has to be examined by a committee chaired by the Designated Officer. Rule 8 requires the Designated Officer to serve a notice upon the intermediary against whom the request has been made to file a reply or any clarifications. Subsequently, the Committee needs to examine the request and in case it finds merit in the request, it seeks approval from the Secretary, Department of Information Technology upon such recommendation, and directs the intermediary to block the required information. While the press note does not mention the rule under which the government has proceeded, it appears this procedure has not been followed. The government seems to have instead relied upon Rule 9 that provides for blocking in emergency cases. This seems evident from statements in the press release such as “emergent nature of threats” and “a matter of very deep and immediate concern which requires emergency measures”. Given that the government has utilized an emergency narrative, it appears that this press release is only an interim measure that still requires ratification from the committee[3]. In any case, the government had been aware of the alleged shortcomings of the banned apps for a while. Hence, the urgency required to resort to Rule 9 did not exist.
- Reasons to be recorded in writing
Section 69A of the Information Technology Act requires that the order for blocking of access to online content must be supported by reasons and the same have to be recorded in writing. In the landmark case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [4]the Supreme Court held this to be very important as the Order invoking Section 69A can be challenged under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. In this case, the sole notification available publicly is a press release that does not satisfy the requirement of order on part of the government.
- Restriction on Fundamental Rights of Individual
The Indian government’s decision to ban 59 Chinese apps limits the fundamental right to free speech and expression. It restricts their freedom of access to the internet under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. The decision to ban Chinese apps has a profound impact since a large part of the Indian population accesses those services regularly. Starting from the purchase of groceries (Big Basket App) and taking food (Zomato and Swiggy Apps) to book tickets (Make my Trip App), majority of Indian citizens depend on the Apps which are either developed by China or the Apps in which China have major shares of investments. Estimates by Sensor Tower revealed that TikTok has about 611 million downloads in India over the app’s lifetime. The app has brought marginalized people online in a way that no other app has been able to[5]. An independent artist from the rural background was able to showcase their skills and talent in a way that was previously the monopoly of groups with greater social capital. In Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala[6] the Kerela High Court recognized that interfering with someone’s access to the internet violates inter alia their fundamental right to privacy. In light of this, the ban amounts to a significant restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression and less restrictive should be used by the Government.
- Absence of the Public Order
The legal order that empowers the designated authority to implement the ban has not been made available in the public domain by the Government of India. The only source of information with regards to the order in a press release by the Press Information Bureau. Although Rule 16 of the Blocking rules requires strict confidentiality to be maintained regarding blocking requests, complaints received, and actions were taken but this provision primarily applies to intermediaries. It is a matter of grave concern as 59 apps have been blocked and the order stating the same has not been released yet. The government ought to disclose the orders passed in the interests of transparency and accountability. Recently, it has also been recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India[7] that publishing such orders is the only way in which the reasons and rationale for the decision can be judged. Challenging the decision-making process requires the reasoning to be made public. This has resulted in a wholly unprecedented legal scenario, if not a dangerous precedent.
Conclusion
Indian Government’s decision of banning Chinese apps is a great initiative to ensure the privacy of citizen’s data. Admittedly protecting Indian user’s data from Chinese apps is a matter of valid concern. The Indian Government could have resorted to alternate remedy instead of a blanket ban to 59 apps without considering the individual case of the fundamental right to access the internet. A restriction on access to the internet also has to be fair, just and reasonable and not arbitrary. Instead of blocking the apps, the Indian Government should think of establishing a robust legal framework for cyber laws to address national security concerns. India still does not have a dedicated cybersecurity law which will adequately safeguard the privacy data rights of individuals in sharp contrast to an authoritarian regime like China. For now, the least the government can do is to make available in the public domain, the Interim Order stating detailed reasons to enable the vast number of Indian Citizens associated with the apps to know the rationale behind the ban. Hence, instead of blocking the apps under the present Information Technology Regime, the establishment of a more elaborate regime ought to be considered.
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